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Abstract	
Although	 there	 is	 strong	 scientific	 consensus	 that	 climate	 change	 and	 environmental	
degradation	are	occurring,	there	is	also	a	significant	body	of	opinion	that	is	sceptical	about,	
or	 denies	 the	 validity	 of,	 evidence	 for	 this.	However	 it	 is	 not	 solely	 the	 nature	 of	 differing	
views	about	global	warming	or	ecological	disaster	that	is	being	contested	but	the	case	for	or	
against	intervention	and	regulation	in	the	market.	At	an	international	level,	gestures	toward	
‘sustainability’	 are	 (i)	 compromised	 by	 combining	 them	with	 declarations	 of	 the	 need	 for	
continued	 economic	 growth,	 and	 (ii)	 undermined	 by	 the	 arrangements	 put	 in	 place	 by	
existing	 and	 new	 transnational	 trade	 agreements.	 The	 paper	 examines	 these	 views	 and	
developments,	and	the	patterns	of	denial,	disconnection	and	fragmentation	they	display.		
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Introduction	
In	his	book	States	of	Denial,	Cohen	(2001:	5)	observes	that:	
	
The	 psychology	 of	 ‘turning	 a	 blind	 eye’	 or	 ‘looking	 the	 other	 way’	 is	 a	 tricky	
matter.	These	phrases	imply	that	we	have	access	to	reality,	but	choose	to	ignore	it	
because	 it	 is	 convenient	 to	 do	 so.	 …	 ‘Knowing’,	 though,	 can	 be	 far	 more	
ambiguous.	We	 are	 vaguely	 aware	 of	 choosing	 not	 to	 look	 at	 the	 facts,	 but	 not	
quite	conscious	of	just	what	it	is	we	are	evading.	We	know,	but	at	the	same	time	
we	don’t	know.	
	
The	discussion	that	follows	starts	from	‘knowing’	about	a	particular	‘problem’.	The	problem	can	
be	 divided	 into	 two	 parts.	 First,	 the	 planet	 is	 suffering	 the	 consequences	 of	 various	 forms	 of	
environmental	degradation	and	over‐exploitation;	notable	among	these	is	the	process	of	climate	
change.	 About	 this	 proposition	 there	 is	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 consensus	 among	natural	 and	 social	
scientists	(Huwart	and	Verdier	2013;	Royal	Society	2012)	and	yet	–	to	identify	the	second	part	
of	the	‘problem’	–	despite	this	knowledge	and	related	awareness	that	the	economics	of	growth	
are	not	helpful	to	aims	of	achieving	environmental	sustainability,	the	international	institutions	
charged	with	responsibility	for	global	wellbeing	consistently	fail	to	agree	on	sufficiently	radical	
or	powerful	remedial	responses.	In	fact,	in	various	ways,	these	bodies	are	gearing	up	for	a	new	
phase	of	increased	transnational	trade	and	stimuli	to	growth.	The	aim	here	is	to	question	how	
and	 why	 this	 is	 happening	 –	 what	 forms	 of	 denial,	 disconnection	 and	 disengagement	 are	 at	
work?		
	
The	first	section	introduces	the	irony	of	dependence	on	goods	which	we	consume,	produced	by	
activities	which	are	consuming	our	planet.	 It	discusses	 the	disconnections	between	narratives	
that	underpin	awareness	of	this,	as	well	as	lack	of	willingness	to	address	it.	The	second	section	
examines	forms	of	transnational	trade	agreements	to	illustrate	this	tension	in	practice	but	also	
to	expose	some	of	the	workings	and	implications	of	these	agreements	and	their	secret	dispute	
resolution	 mechanisms.	 The	 third	 part	 of	 the	 paper	 reviews	 explanations	 for	 denial	 and	 the	
rejection	of	scientific	evidence,	and	how	this	way	of	looking	at	the	world	also	often	embraces	a	
view	 of	 the	 market	 in	 keeping	 with	 neo‐liberal	 principles.	 The	 paper	 concludes	 by	 applying	
Bandura’s	 (2016)	 notion	 of	 moral	 disengagement	 and	 Ruggiero’s	 (2015)	 analysis	 of	 the	
neutralization	of	the	‘legitimacy	of	collective	claims’	against	dominant	interests.		
	
Conflicting	narratives,	fragmentation	and	disconnection	
On	 an	 international	 scale,	 the	 ongoing,	 ecodical	 impacts	 of	 global	 ‘business	 as	 usual’,	 serving	
corporate	and	 state	 interests	 and	both	 creating	 and	 responding	 to	 the	power	 and	patterns	of	
everyday	aspiration	and	consumption,	all	occur	despite	well‐known	evidence	of	consequences	
(Brisman	 and	 South	 2014;	 South	 2010).	 There	 is	 inconsistency	 and	 fragmentation	 in	 our	
thinking,	whether	as	individuals	or	on	the	international	stage.		
	
Double	meanings,	ambiguous	messages,	double	binds	and	conflicting	narratives	are	commonly	
found	 in	 relation	 to	 our	 simultaneous	 dependence	 on	 and	 domination	 of	 nature	 or	 the	
environment.	Naomi	Klein	(2014)	suggests	that	humans	are	engaging	in	cognitive	dissonance	on	
a	planetary	scale.	As	she	puts	it,	at	this	‘jarring	moment	in	history,	when	a	crisis	we	have	been	
studiously	ignoring	is	hitting	us	in	the	face	...	we	are	doubling	down	on	the	stuff	that	is	causing	
the	crisis	in	the	first	place’	(Klein	2014:	3).	Her	examples	of	‘irony	laden	snapshots	of	a	climate	
increasingly	inhospitable	to	the	very	industries	most	responsible	for	its	warming’	(Klein	2014:	
2)	 include	 historic	 floods	 in	 2013	 in	 Calgary	 forcing	 the	 closure	 of	 the	 head	 offices	 of	 oil	
companies	mining	the	tar	sands	of	Alberta	in	Canada;	drought	affecting	the	Mississippi	River	in	
the	USA	leaving	levels	so	 low	that	coal	and	oil	barges	could	not	move	for	days;	and	closure	of	
coal‐fired	power	plants	because	waterways	that	were	relied	on	for	coolant	were	either	too	dry	
or	too	hot.		
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Ideas	of	‘denial’	and	‘contestation’	have	been	applied	elsewhere	to	human	engagement	with	the	
challenges	of	environmental	degradation	and	damage	(Brisman	and	South	2015a,	2015b;	South	
2016)	but	the	ideas	of	 ‘fragmentation’	and	 ‘disconnection’	 in	relation	to	 international	 levels	of	
law	and	environmental	policy	can	be	explored	further.		
	
Fragmentation	 is	 not	 necessarily	 used	 here	 in	 the	 senses	 found	 in	 psychiatry	 or	 psychology	
(Campbell	2009:	392;	Psychology	Dictionary	n.d.)	although	these	have	perhaps	been	influential	
in	 shaping	 sociological	 understandings.	 So,	 for	 example,	 Fuchs	 (2007:	 385)	 refers	 to	 Richard	
Sennett’s	 (1998)	observations	on	 some	of	 the	characteristics	of	 a	post‐modern	 society,	which	
Sennett	sees	as	corrosive	of	‘qualities	of	character	which	bind	human	beings	to	one	another	and	
furnishes	 each	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 sustainable	 self’	 (Sennett	 1998:	 27).	 Thus,	 for	 Sennett,	 the	
experience	of	time	has	now	become	‘disjointed’	and	threatens	‘the	ability	of	people	to	form	their	
characters	into	sustained	narratives’	(Sennett	1998:	31);	this	makes	us	‘pliant’	personalities	that	
represent	 ‘a	 collage	 of	 fragments’,	 ‘suited	 to	 short‐term	work	experience,	 flexible	 institutions,	
and	 constant	 risk‐taking’	 (Sennett	 1998:	 133).	 Increasingly,	 as	 Fuchs	 (2007:	 385)	 remarks,	
‘individuals	 …	 “compartmentalize”	 their	 lives,	 their	 relationships	 and	 their	 attitudes,	without	
striving	 for	coherence.	Simultaneously	or	successively,	they	 live	 in	very	different	worlds	that	are	
not	related	to	one	another’	(emphasis	added).	
	
This	 last	 point	 is	 what	 I	 mean	 by	 ‘disconnection’.	 In	 fact	 we	 do	 all	 share	 one	 real,	 physical,	
material	world	–	and,	like	it	or	not,	we	are	all	‘connected’	to	it.	But	in	relation	to	understanding	
and	agreeing	on	the	nature	of	 its	endangered	status	there	 is	considerable	 ‘disconnection’	 from	
reality,	from	science,	and	from	the	facts	and	process	of	change.	Appreciation	of	the	inevitability	
of	change,	the	significance	of	temporality	and	the	need	to	take	a	long‐term	view,	instead	of	the	
consumerist	short‐termism	we	are	conditioned	into	(Brisman	and	South	2015b),	are	important	
features	of	the	attempt	to	re‐build	sustainable	coherence	in	our	own	fragmented	lives	as	well	as	
motivate	 and	 guide	 us	 to	 see	 why	 we	 need	 to	 respond	 to	 global	 issues	 like	 environmental	
degradation	and	climate	change.	As	Norgaard	(2006:	362)	observes:	
	
Environmentalists	 have	 described	 how	Western	 societies’	 failure	 to	 think	 on	 a	
longer	 time	 scale	 is	 part	 of	 why	 we	 have	 created	 long‐term	 environmental	
degradation	such	as	nuclear	waste.	In	contrast,	the	Iroquois	nation	is	reputed	to	
make	 decisions	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 how	 they	would	 affect	 people	 living	 7	
generations	in	the	future.	
	
Temporality	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 rights	 of	 future	 generations	 (Bell	 2012;	 Brisman	 and	 South	
2015b)	 but	 also	 to	 the	 choices	made	 now	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 those	 rights	 and	 enable	 future	
generations	to	have	some	choices	left	(for	example,	Shue	2014).	But	at	present,	the	problems	of	
fragmentation	 and	 disconnection	 do	 not	 help	 us	 address	 either	 the	 future	 agenda	 or	 current	
dilemmas.	As	Grear	and	Gearty	(2014:	2)	observe:	
	
The	fractious	dynamics	and	pressures	accompanying	interactions	between	socio‐
economic	and	environmental	rights	are	all	too	familiar	to	scholars,	policy‐makers	
and	 others	 confronting	 the	 tendencies	 of	 law	 and	 rights	 discourse	 to	 separate	
issues	into	conceptual	and	institutional	silos,	while	the	powerful	tendencies	of	a	
globalized	 juridical	 and	 economic	 order	 present	 complex	 and	 paradoxical	
challenges	to	the	search	for	a	climate‐friendly	structural	direction.	
	
One	key	disconnect	representing	paradox	and	short	term	thinking	is	that	found	between	what	
are	arguably	two	of	the	dominant	global	narratives	of	the	moment:	on	the	one	hand,	calls	to	ease	
the	 mechanisms	 of	 international	 trade	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 calls	 to	 control	 and	 reduce	
climate	change	harms.	As	an	example	of	this,	consider	the	position	(and	indeed	job	remit)	of	the	
UK	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change.	 As	 Dyke	 (2015)	 points	 out,	 the	
Infrastructure	Act	 (2015)	makes	 reference	 to	 ‘maximising	 economic	 recovery	 of	 petroleum	 in	
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the	United	Kingdom’	which	means	that	in	future	the	Minister	will	‘be	legally	obliged	to	promote	
the	 extraction	 of	 fossil	 fuels,	 while	 also	 being	 legally	 obliged	 to	 reduce	 emissions	 as	 a	
consequence	of	the	2008	Climate	Change	Act’.		
	
De	 Schutter	 (2014),	 a	 former	 UN	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 the	 Right	 to	 Food,	 recognises	 the	
characteristics	of	 fragmentation	and	disconnection	affecting	trade	 law	and	climate	discourses,	
which	combine	to	subvert	the	prospect	of	international	law	managing	to	be	coherently	unified	
in	relation	to	both.	Commenting	on	this,	Grear	and	Gearty	(2014:	2)	point	out	that	‘[t]hese	two	
regimes	 have	 separate	 negotiation	 fora,	 separate	 enforcement	 regimes,	 separate	 dispute	
resolution	methods	and	remain	largely	autonomous	from	general	international	law’.		
	
De	 Schutter	 (2014)	 recognises	 that	 current	 patterns	 of	 trade	 reflect	 north‐south	 relations	 of	
exploitation,	based	on	a	history	of	colonialism,	but	argues	that	these	patterns	will	change	as	the	
market	itself	becomes	a	tool	to	enforce	compliance	with	climate‐friendly	requirements	such	as	
use	 of	 clean	 technologies,	 support	 for	 south‐south	 trade,	 and	 diversification	 of	 developing	
economies	 away	 from	 over‐reliance	 on	 fossil‐fuel	 production	 processes.	 So,	 what	 are	 the	
prospects	for	this?	
	
There	are	some	problems	with	the	assumption	that	 ‘clean	technologies’	do	not	have	their	own	
paradoxical	 downsides,	 not	 least	 the	 reliance	 of	most	 new	 e‐technologies	 on	metals	 that	 are	
extracted	 from	 the	 earth	 in	 these	 same	 over‐exploited	 nations	 and	 regions,	 accompanied	 by	
profiteering,	 human	 rights	 violations	 and	 conflicts	 (Brisman	 and	 South	 2013a;	 Brisman	 and	
South	2015c).	Furthermore,	while	there	is	at	least	some	sense	of	a	forward	looking	vision	here	
that	attempts	to	bring	the	 ideas	of	economic	growth	and	climate	mitigation	together,	as	many	
have	argued,	these	two	aims	are	not	readily	compatible	(Washington	2015).		
	
Bandura	 (2016)	 shows	 how	 people	 and	 organizations	 can	 employ	 distortions	 of	 moral	
argument	 and	 manipulation	 of	 language	 to	 disengage	 from	 the	 harmful	 possibilities	 of	 their	
activities.	In	a	different	way	but	with	a	similar	outcome,	Rayner	(2012:	112)	has	described	how	
‘diverse	 principles’	 and	 ‘constructive	 ambiguities’	 can	 co‐exist	 in	 various	 ways	 that	 enable	
different	 organizations	 to	work	 alongside	 each	other	 by	 finding	 grounds	 for	 compromise	 and	
agreement	 rather	 than	 questioning	 motives,	 agendas	 and	 worldviews.	 This	 is	 a	 form	 of	
‘satisficing’	behaviour	that	in	economic	theory	describes	how	choices	are	made	in	a	rational	way	
within	certain	constraints	that	involve	limited	or	simplified	knowledge	and	compromise	(Scott	
2014:	662).	
	
To	illustrate,	consider	the	meeting	of	28	April	2015	concerning	trade	and	environment,	held	to	
mark	the	twentieth	anniversary	of	 the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO).	On	this	occasion	the	
WTO	Director‐General	Roberto	Azevêdo	shared	the	platform	with	the	Executive	Director	of	the	
United	 Nations	 Environment	 Programme	 (UNEP),	 Mr	 Achim	 Steiner.	 According	 to	 the	 WTO	
Press	Release	(WTO	2015),	both	‘emphasized	the	need	to	redouble	efforts	at	all	levels	to	ensure	
that	 trade	 and	environmental	 policies	 go	hand	 in	 hand’	 and	 the	Director‐General	 of	 the	WTO	
argued	that:	
	
20	years	ago	the	founders	of	the	WTO	saw	clearly	that	the	well‐being	of	habitats,	
societies,	 and	 economies	 are	 not	 separate.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 inextricably	 linked.	
Their	 vision	was	 of	 global	 cooperation	 in	 trade	 as	 a	means	 to	 unleash	 growth,	
alleviate	poverty,	 raise	 living	standards	and	ensure	 full	 employment,	while	also	
protecting	the	environment.	
	
In	the	20	years	since	then,	the	connections	between	trade	and	the	environment	
have	 grown	 significantly.	We	must	 therefore	do	more	 to	 ensure	 that	 trade	 and	
environmental	policies	work	better	 together,	both	at	national	and	 international	
levels.	
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How,	 then,	 do	 recent	 proposals	 to,	 as	 the	 Director	 General	 puts	 it,	 further	 ‘unleash	 growth’,	
measure	up	to	this	aspiration?		
	
First,	 this	 shared	 platform	brings	 together	what	may	 seem	 antithetical	 positions	 to	 declare	 a	
united	 ambition	 to	 solve	 all	 the	worlds’	 problems	 –	 but	without	having	 to	 change	 any	 of	 the	
causes	 of	 these.	 This	 reflects	 three	 key	 points	 related	 to	 fragmentation	 and	 disconnection:	 a	
desire	to	preserve	 ‘business	as	usual’;	the	imperative	that	any	need	for	fundamental	change	is	
downplayed;	and,	the	final	element,	that	all	of	this	represents	an	assurance	that	when	necessary,	
the	 fragmentation	 of	 positions	 on	 policy	 and	 practice,	 speaking	 and	 acting	 in	 contradictory	
ways,	can	all	be	made	coherent	through	the	articulation	of	higher	level	declarations	of	‘common	
interest’,	proving	that	‘something	is	being	done’.		
	
This	 fits	 perfectly	 with	 Ruggiero’s	 (2015:	 99‐100)	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 powerful	 can	 justify	
detrimental	or	criminal	activities.	As	Ruggiero	says:	
	
The	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful	 …	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 result	 of	 proximity	 among	
actors,	mutual	 trust,	 imitation,	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 perpetuate	 bonds,	 values	 and	
group	 interests.	 …	 Proper	 philosophical	 and	 political	 justification	 requires	 that	
partial	concerns	and	 factional	gains	be	depicted	as	beneficial	 to	 the	collectivity;	
therefore	 it	 entails	 agreed	 upon	 definitions	 of	 the	 common	 good	 and	 the	
identification	of	higher	common	principles.		
	
In	 terms	of	 current	 global	 developments,	 this	 analysis	 can	be	extended	 to	examination	of	 the	
Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	(TTIP)	–	in	which	the	USA	faces	toward	Europe	
–	and	the	Trans‐Pacific	Partnership	(TPP)	in	which	the	USA	faces	toward	Asia.	These	proposed	
‘partnerships’	are	promoted	as	trade	agreements	but,	unlike	agreements	of	 the	past	that	have	
been	aimed	at	easing	the	flow	of	trade	and	overcoming	the	barriers	of	protectionism,	these	are	
new	 systems	 that	 are	 building	 up	 secretive	mechanisms	 of	 private	 justice	 and	 protection	 of	
corporate	interests.		
	
Note	here,	four	points	that	are	central	to	my	argument.	First,	the	faster	flow	of	trade	is	intended	
to	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	 which,	 as	 noted,	 is	 a	 serious	 contributor	 to	 environmental	
degradation	and	climate	change.	Second,	secrecy	and	private	justice	are	all	undermining	of,	and	
actually	 opposed	 to,	 transparency.	 Third,	 the	 proposed	 removal	 of	 barriers	 to	 trade	will	 also	
entail	 (formally	or	 informally,	 legally	or	 illegally)	removal	of	various	protections	of	 forest	and	
water	resources	as	well	as	rights	of	Indigenous	peoples.	Fourth,	in	this	sense,	these	agreements	
can	 be	 seen	 not	 so	 much	 as	 forms	 of	 ‘neo‐colonialism’	 but	 re‐invented	 ‘old	 colonialism’	 and	
distortions	of	‘justice’	(Mondaca	2017;	Rodríguez	Goyes	and	South	2016,	2017).		
	
Neo‐liberal	trade	deals	and	private	courts	
Shultz	 (2015)	points	out	 that	 ‘The	 system	of	 closed‐door	 trade	 tribunals	has	been	around	 for	
decades	now’	but	‘was	virtually	unknown	except	among	a	small	cadre	of	international	lawyers	
and	trade	specialists’.		
	
The	 mechanism	 of	 ISDS	 –	 Investor‐State	 Dispute	 Settlement	 –	 provides	 the	 legitimate	 and	
formalised	means	by	which	corporations	can	sue	governments	when	they	introduce	–	or	even	
seek	to	introduce	–	laws	that	might	affect	the	profitability	of	‘business	as	usual’.	ISDS	provides	a	
parallel	justice	system,	an	alternative	to	the	(relatively	more)	transparent	normal	justice	system	
of	 courts,	 operating	 secret	 offshore	 tribunals	 (Crouch	 2014;	 Monbiot	 2015).	 At	 present	 in	
Australia	 and	 Uruguay	 the	 tobacco	 company	 Phillip	 Morris	 is	 suing	 because	 of	 measures	
introduced	 to	 discourage	 smoking;	 in	 El	 Salvador,	 a	 Canadian‐Australian	mining	 company	 is	
suing	for	$300	million	because	of	the	prevention	of	toxic	mining	operations;	while	Germany	is	
facing	‘a	demand	of	Euro	700	million	from	a	nuclear	energy	company	because,	in	the	aftermath	
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of	the	Fukushima	disaster,	popular	movements	won	a	moratorium	on	new	nuclear	power	plants	
in	the	country’	(Shultz	2015).		
	
By	examining	the	experience	of	South	America,	which	has	provided	a	number	of	testing	grounds	
for	the	neo‐liberalization	of	economic	sectors,	several	indicators	and	predictors	of	the	impact	of	
ISDS	can	be	found.	Shultz	(2015)	argues	that	the	case	that	‘brought	the	system	into	broad	public	
view’	was	the	‘water	revolt’	in	Cochabamba,	Bolivia,	in	protest	against	the	privatization	of	public	
water	 supply	 and	 take‐over	 by	 the	 Californian	 firm	 of	 Bechtel.	 This	 well‐known	 episode	 of	
callous	exploitation	is	described	elsewhere	(for	example,	in	McClanahan	et	al.	2015)	but	in	ways	
that	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 contest	 around	 the	 period	 of	 privatization	 and	 conflicts	 between	
military	and	police	and	protestors.	However	the	origins	of	the	deal	are	pertinent	here	and	lie	in	
conditions	imposed	by	the	World	Bank	in	1997	which,	in	return	for	investment	in	the	nation’s	
water	 service,	 required	 Bolivia	 ‘to	 offer	 a	 40‐year	 lease	 to	 Bechtel	with	 a	 guaranteed	 annual	
profit	of	16	per	cent’.	When	Bechtel	withdrew	as	a	result	of	protests	and	bad	publicity,	 it	then	
sought	to	use	a	World	Bank	trade	court	to	claim	US$1	million	it	argued	it	had	invested	in	Bolivia	
as	 well	 as	 a	 further	 US$50	million	 that	 it	 calculated	 as	 foregone	 future	 profits.	 In	 response,	
further	 counter	 campaigns	 followed	 nationally	 and	 internationally	 and	 eventually	 Bechtel	
withdrew	 from	 the	 process.	 What	 the	 case	 drew	 attention	 to	 was	 not	 merely	 the	 fact	 that	
Bechtel	 had	 not	 given	 up	 and	 believed	 it	 could	 still	 extract	 enormous	 profits	 from	 the	
privatization	of	water	but	that	a	mechanism	existed	that	might	enable	it	to	do	this.		
	
The	promotion	of	these	partnerships	also	presumes	and	implies	that	the	relationship	between	
‘Trade	and	Environment’	is,	without	question,	positive	but	as	Gerstetter	(2013)	points	out,	this	
is	not	so	(see	also	Gerstetter	and	Meyer‐Ohlendorf	2013).	In	the	case	of	Peru,	the	former	Vice‐
Minister	 for	 the	 Environment	 (Echave	 2015)	 has	 described	 the	 experience	 of	 that	 country	
following	the	2007	bilateral	Free	Trade	Agreement	with	the	USA,	suggesting	this	is	relevant	to	
debate	about	the	TPP	today.	
	
Echave	(2015)	writes	that	‘President	Barack	Obama	claims	that	the	TPP	would	be	the	first	U.S.	
agreement	 with	 enforceable	 labor	 and	 environmental	 standards’	 (emphasis	 in	 original)	 and	
‘thus	provide	“protections	that	have	been	absent	in	previous	agreements”’.	He	then	points	out	
that	key	provisions	in	the	Peru	FTA	also	prohibited	the	‘rollback	of	environmental	and	worker	
protections.	But	 last	year,	 the	Peruvian	government	enacted	a	package	of	 laws	…	that	did	 just	
that.	The	agreement	made	no	difference	…’	(Echave	2015).	
	
According	to	Enchave	(2015)	much	of	the	damage	done	and	promises	broken,	relate	to	resource	
extraction	and	the	exploitation	of	the	environment:	
	
The	U.S.‐Peru	FTA	also	had	a	special	annex	on	forestry.	As	is	now	being	promised	
for	similar	conservation	rules	in	the	TPP,	these	terms	were	supposed	to	counter	
‘illegal	logging,	and	illegal	trade	in	wildlife,	including	wildlife	trafficking’.	But	six	
years	 later,	 Peru’s	 Amazonian	 forests	 face	 an	 illegal	 logging	 crisis	 with	‘major	
violations’	suspected	in	almost	70	percent	of	all	logging	concessions.	
	
Enchave	(2015)	describes	how	protests	have	been	met	by	force;	for	example:	
	
On	June	5,	2009,	Peruvian	security	forces	attacked	several	thousand	indigenous	
Awajun	and	Wambis	protestors,	including	many	women	and	children,	who	were	
blocking	 the	 ‘Devil's	 Curve’,	 a	 jungle	 highway	 near	 Bagua,	 600	 miles	 north	 of	
Lima.	 The	 protestors	 were	 demanding	 revocation	 of	 decrees	 providing	 new	
access	 to	 exploit	 their	 Amazonian	 lands	 for	 oil,	 gas	 and	 logging	 that	 had	 been	
enacted	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 FTA’s	 investor	 rights	 requirements.	 …	 What	 has	
become	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Amazon’s	 Tiananmen’	 brought	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 U.S.‐
Peru	FTA	into	sharp	relief.	Rather	than	being	a	new	trade	agreement	model,	as	it	
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was	 sold,	 at	 its	 heart	were	 the	 same	extreme	 investor	 rights	 that	 animated	 the	
North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA).	
	
Foreign	 corporations	 have	 used	 these	 investor‐state	 dispute	 settlement	 (ISDS)	
powers,	 both	 explicitly	 and	 behind	 the	 scenes,	 to	 pressure	 the	 Peruvian	
government	 to	pardon	polluters	and	to	strong‐arm	mining	concessions	 in	areas	
of	 the	country	where	 indigenous	communities	continue	to	rise	up	 in	opposition	
to	environmentally	damaging	projects.	…	And	Renco,	a	U.S.	firm,	sought	to	evade	
its	 contractual	 commitment	 to	 remediate	 environmental	 and	 health	 problems	
caused	 by	 its	 toxic	metal	 smelting	 operation	 that	 had	 poisoned	 children	 in	 the	
community	of	La	Oroya,	by	launching	an	$800	million	ISDS	claim	against	Peru’s	
government.	
	
Former	Vice‐Minister	 Enchave	 (2015)	 concludes	 that,	 ‘Peru’s	 story	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 time	 to	
rethink	how	we	 approach	 trade	 agreements	 before	 “Fast	Tracking”	more	 of	 the	 same	 via	 the	
TPP’.	 ‘More	 of	 the	 same’	 will	 undoubtedly	 increase	 the	 types,	 and	 levels,	 of	 activity	 that	 are	
known	 to	 be	 contributors	 to	 climate	 change	 and	 environmental	 damage.	 As	 Monbiot	 (2015)	
puts	it,	they	will	‘promote	the	interests	of	transnational	capital	by	downgrading	the	defence	of	
human	 health,	 the	 natural	world,	 labour	 rights,	 and	 the	 poor	 and	 vulnerable	 from	 predatory	
corporate	 practices’.	 These	 deals	 to	 accelerate	 economic	 transactions	 and	 growth	 are	
encouraged	by	bodies	like	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	the	organisation	that	in	2015	shared	
the	platform	with	 the	United	Nations	Environment	Programme,	with	both	 acknowledging	 the	
need	to	‘do	more	to	ensure	that	trade	and	environmental	policies	work	better	together’.	Action	
and	 stated	 aspiration	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 disconnected,	 the	 implications	 of	 one	 for	 the	 other	
denied.	 In	 the	next	 section	of	 the	paper	 I	 explore	 these	problems	of	disconnection	and	denial	
further.		
	
Consensus	and	dissensus	about	climate	change	and	environmental	degradation	
There	 is	 very	 strong	 scientific	 consensus	 and	 a	 heavy	 weight	 of	 evidence	 supporting	 the	
argument	that	climate	change	is	occurring,	that	the	rate	of	change	is	increasing,	and	that	this	is	
bad	 for	 the	 planet	 and	 its	 populations,	 human	 or	 non‐human	 (IPCC	 2013;	 Klein	 2014;	 Royal	
Society	and	US	National	Academy	of	Sciences	2014).	Furthermore,	this	is	occurring	at	the	time	
when	 other	 signals	 of	 local	 and	 global	 environmental	 damage	 are	 being	 recorded	 as	 serious	
(Milman	2015;	UNEP	2016).	However,	there	are	also	powerful	and	influential	sources	of	opinion	
–	scientific,	political,	 cultural	–	 that	variously	argue	 that	climate	change	 is	not	occurring,	or	at	
least	not	at	a	rate	that	cannot	be	remediated	by	technology,	or	that	some	version	of	it	is	but	this	
is	 actually	 a	 good	 thing	 (Non‐Governmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 2013;	 Ridley	 2013;	
Robinson	2008a;	and	see	discussion	in	Brisman	and	South	2015a).		
	
Criminology	and	climate	change	
From	 a	 criminological	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 a	 range	 of	 criminal	 and	
environmental	 offences	 will	 be	 among	 the	 consequences	 of	 climate	 change	 that	 we	 should	
anticipate,	and	some	of	these	will	be	directly	caused	by,	arise	from,	or	be	subject	to,	attempts	to	
regulate,	mitigate,	adapt	and	enforce	 laws	(Agnew	2012;	Farrall	et	al.	2012;	Fussey	and	South	
2012;	Kramer	 2013;	 South	 2012:	 99‐102;	White	 2012a,	 2012b:	 4‐5).	 Among	 future	 effects	 of	
climate	 change	we	 could	 expect	 and	 predict	 environmental	 conditions	 that	 result	 in	 scarcity,	
which	can	be	criminogenic	in	encouraging	corruption,	illicit	markets,	profiteering,	trafficking	in	
human	beings	as	environmental	refugees,	and	riots.	
	
If	the	evidence	regarding	climate	change	is	credible	and	convincing,	as	the	scientific	consensus	
would	seem	to	show,	what	are	we	to	make	of	varieties	of	disbelief	and	denial?	One	starting	point	
would	be	to	draw	upon	insights	from	the	social	psychology	of	denial	as	explored	in	studies	of	
public	opinion	and	belief	in	science.	But,	 in	addition,	at	this	point	it	is	worth	flagging	a	further	
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factor	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 contest	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 climate	 change	 or	 other	 serious	
environmental	threats	are	‘real’	and	whether	or	not	there	should	be	a	response	–	and	this	is	also	
a	key	concept	for	criminology	–	this	is	the	matter	of	power.		
	
The	rejection	of	science:	Climate	change,	authoritarianism,	contrarianism	and	conspiracy	
Kuehne	(2014:	492)	notes	that	there	are	various	reasons	why	people	might	‘deny	that	climate	
change	is	occurring	or	express	skepticism	about	aspects	of	 it’	and	takes	the	case	of	Australian	
farmers	as	a	category	of	 interested	parties,	 facing	particular	financial,	psychological	and	social	
stresses	and	uncertainties	related	to	climate	change,	to	illustrate	the	basis	for	such	responses.	In	
this	case	 it	can	be	shown	that	 ‘skepticism	 is	not	 the	same	as	denial’	and	the	scepticism	of	 the	
farmers	 ‘can	 be	 understood	 and	 addressed	 by	 recognizing	 that	 other	 issues	may	 be	 of	more	
immediate	 concern	 to	 them,	 such	 as	 their	 business	 viability’.	 Thus,	 matters	 of	 personal	
investment	 in	 identity,	 land,	community	and	friendship	networks,	alongside	psychological	and	
cultural	 interpretations	 of	 climate	 change	 threats	 and	 challenges,	 need	 to	 be	 factored	 into	
messages	calling	for	change,	not	just	‘scientific	facts’.	If	the	latter	were	sufficiently	persuasive,	it	
might	 be	 assumed	 that	 ‘deniers’	 simply	need	 to	 be	 convinced	 that	 climate	 change	 is	 real	 and	
they	 will	 then	 support	 action.	 But	 changing	 minds	 so	 easily	 may	 actually	 be	 an	 ‘unlikely’	
prospect	 or	 ‘take	 too	 long’	 because	 these	 beliefs	 are	 based	 ‘on	 ideological	 positions,	 not	 on	
scientific	evidence’	(Bain	et	al.	2012).		
	
As	Lefsrud	and	Meyer	(2012:	1478)	have	pointed	out,	while	there	is	 ‘broad	consensus’	among	
climate	 scientists	 about	 global	 warming	 and	 its	 related	 impacts,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 degree	 of	
scepticism	within	the	scientific	literature	that	needs	to	be	noted.	In	terms	of	the	‘proportion	of	
papers	found	in	the	ISI	Web	of	Science	database	that	explicitly	endorsed	anthropogenic	climate	
change’	there	was	a	fall	‘from	75	[per	cent]	(for	the	period	between	1993	and	2003)’	at	2004,	to	
45	per	cent	for	the	period	between	2004	to	2008,	while	‘outright	disagreement’	rose	from	0	per	
cent	 to	 6	 per	 cent	 –	 which	 is	 still	 a	 small	 percentage	 but	 significant	 compared	 to	 zero.	 The	
authors	suggest	this	may	be	interpreted	in	the	following	ways:	for	example,	on	the	one	hand,	as	
a	‘manifestation	of	increasing	taken‐for‐grantedness	…	of	anthropogenic	climate	science’	or,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 the	 ‘rise	 in	 disagreement	may	be	 a	 result	 of	 increased	 funding	 of	 sceptics	 by	
fossil	 fuel	 industries,	 conservative	 foundations	 and	 think	 tanks’	 (Lefsrud	 and	 Meyer	 2012:	
1478).	 But	 importantly,	 they	 also	 note	 that	 ‘apart	 from	 discussions	 among	 scientists,	 public	
concern	over	climate	change	is	also	waning’	(Lefsrud	and	Meyer	2012:	1478).	
	
Data	on	public	opinion	changes,	of	course,	and	it	is	unwise	to	rely	on	surveys	from	several	years	
ago	 but	 trends	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 dramatically	 reversing	 (see	 also	 Hamilton	 2013:	 16‐17).	
Furthermore,	if	votes	for	politicians	and	political	positions	are	an	indicator,	substantial	numbers	
of	citizens	in	Australia,	the	UK,	the	rest	of	Europe,	and	the	USA	are	not	seeing	green	issues	as	a	
major	 priority	 for	 their	 governments.	 Green	 parties	 may	 have	 grown	 but	 with	 only	 a	 few	
exceptions,	they	are	not	being	voted	into	positions	of	power.		
	
It	has	 to	be	emphasised	 that	 the	 lobby	representing	scepticism	or	 rejection	regarding	climate	
change	 evidence	 is	 powerful	 and	 influential	 but	 it	 is	 also	 quite	 diverse.	 It	 does	 not	 represent	
only	the	voices	of	the	fossil	fuel	energy	industry.	It	is	also	supported	by	other	interest	groups	as	
well	as	 those	 ‘ordinary	voters’	who	–	socially,	politically	and	culturally	–	strongly	support	 the	
status	quo	and	who	are	 troubled	by	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 are	 sources	of	 disruptive	 change	 ‘out	
there’	that	cannot	be	avoided	or	ignored.	
	
At	this	point,	I	suggest	that	it	is	interesting	for	criminologists	who	are	primarily	concerned	with	
the	deeply	social	questions	at	stake	here,	to	also	take	a	look	at	what	studies	of	the	psychology	of	
political	orientation	can	 tell	us	about	public	opinion	and	reaction	regarding	climate	change.	A	
good	illustration	of	this	is	presented	by	Lewandowsky	et	al.	(2013)	who	have	examined	trends	
regarding	belief	in	the	credibility	and	findings	of	science	among	the	US	population.		
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The	background	to	this	study	was	the	observation	that	‘[t]he	US	public	has	become	increasingly	
polarized	 in	 their	attitudes	 towards	science’	 and	 that	since	 the	1970s,	 ‘Conservatives	–	unlike	
Liberals	 or	 Moderates	 –	 have	 become	 increasingly	 sceptical	 and	 distrustful	 of	 science’	 with	
‘Polarization	…	particularly	pronounced	with	respect	to	climate	change’.	The	key	proposition	–	
and	 one	 of	 significance	 for	 present	 purposes	 –	 is	 that	 ‘[p]eople	 who	 embrace	 a	 laissez‐faire	
vision	of	the	free	market	are	less	likely	to	accept	that	anthropogenic	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
are	warming	the	planet	than	people	with	an	egalitarian‐communitarian	outlook’	(Lewandosky	
et	 al.	 2013;	 see	 also	 Lewandowsky	 2011;	 Heath	 and	 Gifford	 2006).1	 Or,	 put	 another	 way,	
‘Endorsement	 of	 free	 markets	 in	 combination	 with	 other	 streaks	 of	 “hierarchical”	 or	
“authoritarian”	 thinking	 are	 statistically	 associated	 with	 rejection	 of	 climate	 science’	
(Lewandosky	2011).	Lewandosky	et	al.	 (2013)	 therefore	argue	 that	 the	 ‘driving	psychological	
force	 that	 is	 underlying	 the	 rejection	 of	 science’	 in	 relation	 to	 climate	 change	 ‘is	 “system	
justification”;	that	is,	a	person’s	need	to	perceive	the	current	political	and	economic	system	as	
fair,	legitimate,	and	stable’.	Stability	is	a	particularly	important	dimension	for	this	view	as	it	also	
sees	disruption	to	the	status	quo	as	unwelcome.		
	
What	is	being	contested	here	is	not	so	much	the	nature	of	differing	views	about	global	warming	
or	 climate	 change,	 or	 environmental	 issues	 in	 general,	 but	 the	merit	 or	 otherwise	of	markets	
operating	 according	 to	 principles	 of	 regulation	 versus	 neo‐liberalism	 (see	 also	 Ruggiero	 and	
South	2013).	As	Lewandowsky	(2011)	suggests,	‘[i]f	emissions	must	be	cut,	then	markets	must	
be	regulated	or	at	least	“nudged”	towards	alternative	sources	of	energy	–	and	any	possibility	of	
regulation	is	considered	a	threat	to	the	very	essence’	of	the	worldview	of	those	 ‘for	whom	the	
free	market	is	sacrosanct’.		
	
An	extension	of	this	view	would	pose	the	question	‘whether,	even	if	there	is	genuine	evidence	of	
damaging	climate	change,	 governments	 can	be	 trusted	 to	act	 effectively	when	applying	either	
market	instruments	or	other	policies?’	(Robinson	2008b:	62).	As	noted	above,	governments	may	
say	 they	 ‘know’	 there	 is	 a	 challenge	 and	 promise	 ‘appropriate	 responses’	 but	 instead,	 as	
Robinson	 observes,	 ‘give	 priority	 to	 appearing	 to	 be	 doing	 something’.	 However,	 the	 main	
objective	of	Robinson’s	critique	 is	 to	deride	collective	political	efforts,	as	across	 the	European	
Union,	 for	 example,	 and	 the	value	of	 any	 role	played	by	 centralised	 state	 authorities.	 Instead,	
from	this	position,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	greater	benefits	–	 in	 this	case	as	 in	others	–	would	 follow	
from	‘reliance	on	market	responses,	which	permit	gradual	and	flexible	adjustment	to	perceived	
problems’,	 because	 ‘well‐functioning	 markets	 with	 appropriate	 institutions	 tend	 to	 produce	
benign	reactions	to	emerging	problems’	(Robinson	2008b:	63).		
	
More	generally,	the	appeal	of	denial	or	the	rejection	of	science	resonates	with	political	dislike	of	
‘being	told	what	to	do’	and	populist	criticism	of	advice	and	guidance	concerning	 ‘what	is	good	
for	 you’.	 This	 is	 a	 political	 trait	with	 some	 similarities	 to	 the	 Authoritarian	 Personality	 Type	
presented	 by	 Adorno	 et	 al.	 (1950,	 cited	 on	 the	 Psychologist	 World	 website	 at	
http://www.psychologistworld.com/influence_personality/authoritarian_personality.php),	 the	
elements	of	which	include:		
	
Blind	 allegiance	 to	 conventional	 beliefs	 about	 right	 and	 wrong;	 Respect	 for	
submission	to	acknowledged	authority;	Belief	in	aggression	toward	those	who	do	
not	subscribe	to	conventional	thinking,	or	who	are	different;	A	negative	view	of	
people	in	general	–	i.e.	the	belief	that	people	would	all	lie,	cheat	or	steal	if	given	
the	 opportunity;	 A	 need	 for	 strong	 leadership	which	 displays	 uncompromising	
power;	A	belief	in	simple	answers	and	polemics	–	i.e.	The	media	controls	us	all	or	
The	 source	 of	 all	 our	 problems	 is	 the	 loss	 of	morals	 these	 days;	 Resistance	 to	
creative,	dangerous	ideas.		
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One	further	point	of	interest	here	is	that	a	‘striking	feature	of	the	opposition	to	climate	science’,	
based	on	the	data	of	Lewandowsky	et	al.	(2013),	 is	that	this	is	not	grounded	on	any	 ‘deficit	of	
knowledge	or	ability’	but	instead	seems	to	reflect	a	particular	cognitive	style.		
	
As	the	authors	elaborate:	
	
One	 cognitive	 style	 that	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 implicated	 in	 science	 denial	 is	
conspiratorial	thinking	...,	also	known	as	conspiracist	ideation.	Denial	of	the	link	
between	HIV	and	AIDS	frequently	involves	conspiracist	hypotheses,	for	example	
that	AIDS	was	created	by	the	U.S.	Government.	Popular	books	critical	of	climate	
science	 routinely	 refer	 to	 global	 warming	 as	 a	 ‘conspiracy’	 or	 ‘hoax’,	 and	
conspiracist	 themes	 have	 been	 identified	 in	 climate	 media	 coverage	 and	 in	
people’s	affective	imagery	evoked	by	climate	change.		
	
All	 of	 this	 may	 reflect	 some	 of	 the	 evidence	 available	 regarding	 a	 decline	 in	 public	
understanding	of,	or	interest	in,	real	science	(at	least	in	the	USA,	although	similar	trends	may	be	
found	 elsewhere).	 For	 example,	 a	 2014	 USA	 National	 Science	 Foundation	 report	 indicated	 a	
growing	belief	 in	 the	USA	 in	 the	 credibility	of	 astrology.	This	occurred	most	obviously	where	
correlated	 with	 ‘less	 science	 education’	 and	 ‘less	 factual	 knowledge’	 (Mooney	 2014).	 Where	
science	is	dismissed	or	not	understood,	then	scientific	topics,	no	matter	how	significant,	will	not	
engage	attention	or	meet	with	calls	 for	action.	However,	even	among	the	scientifically	 literate	
and	 those	knowledgeable	 about	 climate	 change,	 other	 forms	of	 stakeholder	priorities	may	be	
dominant	(Kuehne	2014).	So	in	Norgaard’s	(2006:	347)	study	of	a	rural	community	in	Norway,	
findings	 showed	 that	 there	 was	 a	 ‘significant	 population’	 who	 certainly	 do	 ‘know	 about	 and	
express	concern	for	global	warming’	but	where	the	study	data	indicated	that	‘non‐response’	to	
climate	 change	 was	 ‘at	 least	 partially’	 based	 on	 socially	 organized	 denial	 and	 collective	 self‐
interest,	 because	 ‘Norwegian	 economic	 prosperity	 is	 tied	 to	 oil	 production’	 and	 hence	
‘collectively	ignoring	climate	change	maintains	Norwegian	economic	interests’.		
	
Climate	change,	global	warming,	environmental	effects	that	are	 ‘out	of	control’,	and	so	on,	are	
disruptors.	Although	in	one	respect	they	are	‘natural’	(even	though	they	are	anthropogenic	and	
largely	caused	by	human	actions),	 for	 those	who	are	opposed	to	 the	science	and	the	message,	
these	 disruptors	 are	 by	 definition	 not	 part	 of	 the	 traditional	 ‘natural	 order’	 of	 things.	 The	
‘natural	order’	in	this	sense	is	not	a	reflection	of	environmental	matters	but	of	the	historic	status	
quo	and	distribution	of	power,	underpinned	by	imperial	colonisation,	racist	hierarchies,	and	the	
stratification	systems	of	social	class	(Carrington	et	al.	2016).	
	
Lewandowsky	 (2011)	 argues	 that	 the	 climate	 change	 narrative	 represents	 a	 source	 of	
subversion	of	conventional	and	conservative	beliefs.	It	poses:		
	
…	 [a]	 deep	 psychological	 threat	 that	 in	 part	 explains	 the	 hyper‐emotionality	 of	
the	 anti‐science	 discourse:	 the	 fear	 of	 Obama	 as	 an	 alien	 ‘other’;	 frenetic	
alarmism	 about	 a	 ‘world	 government’;	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 ‘warmist’	 or	 ‘extremist’	
leveled	 at	 scientists	 who	 rely	 on	 the	 peer	 reviewed	 literature;	 the	 ready	
invocation	of	the	spectre	of	‘socialism’.		
	
Climate	change	and	the	calls	for	remedial	action	–	such	as	curtailing	growth	–	are	perceived	as	a	
‘threat	so	fundamental	that	even	crazed	beliefs	constitute	an	alluring	antidote’	(Lewandowsky	
2011).	 The	 counter	 responses	 can	 range	 from	 the	 relatively	 modest	 desire	 to	 maintain	 the	
status	quo	and	respect	for	existing	hierarchies,	through	the	promotion	of	authoritarian	views,	to	
a	belief	that	there	is	no	problem	or,	if	there	is,	then	solutions	will	be	delivered	by	higher	forces	–	
whether	 from	 ‘our	kind	of	 science	 (delivering	magic‐bullets)’,	or	astrology,	or	divine	or	other‐
worldly	intervention	(Brisman	and	South	2013b).		
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Conclusion	
I	 began	 by	 quoting	 Cohen	 (2001)	 on	 ‘denial’.	 Recently,	 Bandura	 (2016)	 has	 explored	 some	
similar	 questions	 in	 his	 book	 Moral	 Disengagement:	 How	 People	 Do	 Harm	 and	 Live	 With	
Themselves.	In	the	final	chapter	to	this	book,	Bandura	considers	the	challenge	of	climate	change	
and	 threats	 to	 environmental	 sustainability	 –	 ‘the	 most	 urgent	 issue	 facing	 humankind	 this	
century’	(Bandura	2016:	372).	The	discussion	highlights	the	problem	of	moral	disengagement	
which	allows	the	persistence	of	harmful	environmental	policies	and	practices	on	the	basis	that	
they	 have	 legitimate	 purposes,	 justified	 for	 political	 and	 popular	 consumption	 in	 ‘sanitized,	
convoluted	and	innocuous	language’	(Bandura	2016:	399).		
	
Such	 justifications	 and	 use	 of	 language	 are	 one	 set	 of	 means	 by	 which	 challenges	 to	 the	
dysfunctional	 and	 damaging	 operations	 of	 a	 ‘free	 market’,	 under‐controlled,	 under‐regulated	
and	now	moving	toward	achievement	of	even	greater	non‐accountable	freedoms,	are	diffused.	
Ruggiero’s	(2015:	101)	discussion	of	resistance	to	power	and	the	‘total	commodification	of	life’	
is	relevant	here,	as	he	argues	for	‘the	defence	of	nature,	ecological	justice	between	generations,	
political	 participation	 and	 control	 of	 economic	 initiative’.	 For	 Ruggiero,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
powerful	will	mean	the	pursuit	and	defence	of	the	status	quo,	with	the	aim	of	‘neutralizing	the	
legitimacy	of	collective	claims’	against	the	dominant	narratives	and	uncontrolled	enactments	of	
growth,	 exploitation	 and	 commodification.	 Along	 similar	 lines,	 Monbiot	 (2015)	 asks	 whether	
‘[i]n	 an	 age	 of	 ecocide,	 food	 banks	 and	 financial	 collapse,	 do	 we	 need	more	 protection	 from	
predatory	 corporate	 practices	 or	 less?’	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Higgins	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Trade	
agreements,	as	proposed	in	TTIP	and	TTP,	will	accelerate	not	only	growth	but	also,	as	Monbiot	
(2015)	puts	it,	the	‘reckless,	unjustified	destruction	of	our	rights’.		
	
The	 tragedy	 is	 that,	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 urgency	 of	 actually	 dealing	with	 the	 challenge	 of	
climate	 change	 and	 global	 environmental	 degradation,	 all	 the	 disputes	 about	 evidence,	 the	
differences	in	human	politics,	and	the	demands	for	more	growth	and	more	profit,	are	trivial	and	
unsustainable.	The	world	 is	not	as	 it	was.	Looking	ahead	–	as	Friedrichs	(2015:	116)	warns	–	
‘[t]he	failure	to	adopt	policies	and	practices	that	would	minimize	the	harmful	consequences	of	
global	 warming’	 or	 climate	 change	 ‘may	well	 at	 some	 future	 time	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 crime	 of	
monumental	consequences’.	
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1	 Climate	 change	 is	 not	 the	 only	 issue	 examined	 in	 this	 study	which	 also	 explores	 correlations	 between	 political	
worldviews	and	rejection	of	certain	scientific	findings	concerning	genetically	modified	foods	and	vaccinations	but	
these	are	not	the	focus	here.	
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